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Oil and the National Security: CNOOC's Failed Bid To
Purchase Unocal
On August 2, 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Company
("CNOOC") withdrew its bid to purchase U.S. oil company Unocal in
response to significant political opposition.! CNOOC's bid aroused
intense opposition from Members of Congress and outside observers.
Within weeks of the bid's announcement, the House of
Representatives urged the Bush administration to review the bid on
national security grounds.2 The House based its arguments on the
Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 (the "Amendment"),3 legislation designed to provide for
the review and restriction of foreign direct investment in U.S.
companies that threatens to impair national security! In calling for
review of the Unocal bid, Congress cited numerous concerns over the
proposed acquisition, many of them based more on economic matters
than threats to national security.'
This Recent Development examines these concerns and
concludes that while the CNOOC-Unocal purchase bid was
problematic in some respects,6 any ultimate decision to use the Exon-
Florio Amendment to block the sale based on the congressional
arguments would not have been valid in light of the Amendment's
purpose and design. This Recent Development begins by discussing
CNOOC's bid to purchase Unocal and the intense opposition it
generated, particularly the congressional concerns expressed in
1. See David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid To Buy
U.S. Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al.
2. H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H5570 (2005) (enacted) ("[I]t is the
sense of the House of Representatives that ... [CNOOC] could take action that would
threaten to impair the national security of the United States .... ").
3. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170 (2000)).
4. See id.; H.R. Res. 344 ("Whereas ... the President [is authorized] to suspend or
prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger, or takeover of a United States corporation that
threatens the national security of the United States."). Foreign direct investment is the
ownership of assets of an entity by residents of a foreign country to the extent that the
residents of the foreign country can exert control over the entity. See EDWARD M.
GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 8 (3d ed. 1995).
5. See H.R. Res. 344; see also infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing
the economic factors animating Congress's call for review).
6. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
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House Resolution 344 (the "Resolution"). The piece then examines
the Exon-Florio Amendment, focusing on the five criteria the
Amendment suggests the President should consider when
determining if a proposed acquisition would threaten to impair
national security. The discussion then turns to a comparison of the
concerns expressed in House Resolution 344 with the five Exon-
Florio criteria and the circumstances of the only case where the
Amendment was used to prohibit the foreign acquisition of a U.S.
company. This case study and application of the Amendment's
suggested criteria illustrate that an Exon-Florio block of the
CNOOC-Unocal purchase bid would have been an improper use of
the Amendment. Although the terms of the Exon-Florio
Amendment would not have justified prohibiting this acquisition as a
national security threat, the Chinese government's majority
ownership and subsidization of CNOOC presented a valid cause for
concern in this instance given CNOOC's access to the Chinese
government's resources and the competitive disadvantage created for
competing bidders. This Recent Development concludes by
discussing this concern and suggesting measures that could address
these issues while still encouraging foreign confidence in investment
in the U.S. market.
CNOOC was not the first company to make an offer for Unocal.
Chevron, a privately-owned U.S. oil company, made an offer worth
$16.8 billion of cash and stock on April 4, 2005.' On June 23, 2005,
CNOOC followed suit with an unsolicited, $18.5 billion all-cash bid
for Unocal--almost $2 billion more than the Chevron bid. The
CNOOC bid promptly attracted attention in Washington not because
of its dollar amount, but because the Chinese government held a
seventy percent share in CNOOC.9 On June 30, 2005, the House of
Representatives approved House Resolution 344,10 urging the
President to review the bid as a national security threat pursuant to
7. See Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 1. Chevron ultimately raised its bid to $17
billion in cash and stock. Id.
8. Id.
9. See H.R. Res. 344 ("Whereas the People's Republic of China owns approximately
70 percent of CNOOC. ); see also Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid To Buy U.S. Oil
Firm, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al (stating that Members of Congress opposed
CNOOC's bid in part because CNOOC "benefited from sweetheart financing from the
Communist government in Beijing"). This was one of a string of attempted acquisitions of
foreign companies by Chinese corporations since the Chinese government began
encouraging the purchase of foreign companies to ensure the availability of sufficient raw
materials to supply Chinese industrialization. Peter S. Goodman, China Tells Congress To
Back Off Businesses, WASH. POST, July 5, 2005, at Al.
10. H.R. Res. 344.
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the Exon-Florio Amendment." The Resolution's justifications for a
national security review focused on the economic repercussions of the
proposed acquisition, the Chinese government's ownership of a
majority share of CNOOC, and the petroleum industry's use of
sensitive technologies for oil exploration and production.2 On July
13, 2005, Representative Duncan Hunter threatened to introduce
legislation to directly block the sale as a national security threat. 3
The pressure proved too great for CNOOC. On August 2, 2005,
CNOOC withdrew its bid for Unocal after months of sustained
political opposition. 4 CNOOC blamed its retreat on the difficulty it
was having in determining its chances for success in acquiring
Unocal. 5 The Chinese firm apparently found that its purchase bid
had become too time consuming and risky for it to continue its
pursuit of Unocal. 6
A large portion of this risk stemmed from the possibility that the
President would block the bid pursuant to his authority under Exon-
Florio. Congress passed Exon-Florio in response to several
acquisitions of domestic technology firms by foreign investors in the
1980s. 7 The Amendment provides a mechanism for the President to
11. Id. Instead of waiting for the inevitable, CNOOC tried to save some time by filing
a notice with the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States, requesting an
expedited Exon-Florio review. See Jad Mouawad, Chinese Company Asks U.S. To Review
Its Bid for Unocal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at C4. CNOOC was apparently trying to gain
approval for the bid prior to August 10, 2005, when Unocal shareholders would vote on
the Chevron bid. Id. If CNOOC had received approval of its bid prior to the Chevron
vote, Unocal shareholders would have been more likely to vote down the Chevron bid in
the hope of receiving greater profits from the larger CNOOC bid. See id.
12. See H.R. Res. 344. The majority of the criticisms levied against the proposed
purchase focused on possible economic repercussions from the Chinese acquisition of
Unocal. See id. China criticized the House's arguments, claiming that Congresspersons
were injecting politics into what should have been a purely business matter. Goodman,
supra note 9 (noting the Chinese Foreign Ministry's assertion that "CNOOC's bid to take
over the U.S. Unocal company is a normal commercial activity between enterprises and
should not fall victim to political interference").
13. See Steve Lohr, Unocal Bid Denounced at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at
Cl.
14. Press Release, CNOOC Ltd., CNOOC Limited To Withdraw Unocal Bid (Aug. 2,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at http://www.
cnoocltd.com/press/channel/pressl616.asp.
15. See id. ("This political environment has made it very difficult for us to accurately
assess our chance of success, creating a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable
risk to our ability to secure this transaction.").
16. See id.
17. See Barry K. Robinson, Practical Comments on the Exon-Florio Provisions and
Proposed Regulations, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 173, 179 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 1990) (citing
concerns over the "rapidly increasing number of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms engaged
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review and restrict foreign direct investment in any entity engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States upon credible evidence that
the acquisition threatens to impair national security. 8 Exon-Florio
charges the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States
(the "CFIUS")-an interagency committee acting as the President's
designee 1g-with conducting investigations of certain foreign
acquisitions of domestic companies to analyze any national security
implications.20 A 1992 Amendment21 makes these investigations
mandatory in certain circumstances.2 The CFIUS must now conduct
an Exon-Florio investigation whenever the acquiring party is
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government and the
acquisition may result in control of a U.S. interest that may affect
national security.23 If the President finds, based on the CFIUS
investigation, that the transaction threatens to impair national
security, he can suspend or prohibit the transaction.24 If the parties
in areas of technology. In some instances that technology is directly or indirectly related
to... national security.").
18. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000).
19. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Jan. 9, 1989) (amending Executive
Order 11,858, which established the CFIUS as the President's designee for monitoring the
impact of foreign investment in the United States, to grant the CFIUS investigatory
authority). President Gerald Ford created the CFIUS by executive order in 1975, Exec.
Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1979), to conduct "reviews that protect
national security while maintaining the credibility of [the U.S.] open investment policy and
preserv[e] the confidence of foreign investors here and of U.S. investors abroad that they
will not be subject to retaliatory discrimination," Office of International Investment, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Office of Int'l Inv., Committee on Foreign Investments in the United
States (CFIUS), http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2006). Current committee members include representatives of the Secretaries of
the Treasury (who serves as the chairman of the committee), State, Defense, Commerce,
and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs; and the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy. Id.
20. § 2170(a). Exon-Florio provides that the President or the President's designee can
conduct "an investigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers proposed or pending ... which could result in foreign control
of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States." Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2463-2465 (1992) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170(b) (2000)).
22. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b).
23. Id. ("The President or ... designee shall make an investigation ... in any instance
in which an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to
engage in any merger, acquisition, or takeover which could result in control of a person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national security
of the United States.").
24. Id. § 2170(d).
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have completed the transaction, the President can seek a court order
directing the foreign investor to divest its holdings in the domestic
company.25 To suspend, prohibit, or order the divestiture of a
transaction, the President must specifically find that "there is credible
evidence ... to believe that the foreign interest exercising control
might take action that threatens to impair the national security. 26
The President must also find that existing laws, except for the Exon-
Florio Amendment and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act ("IEEPA"),27 do not provide adequate and appropriate
authority to take the actions required to protect national security.28
Statutory timelines grant the President up to ninety days to make a
final decision.29 Significantly, the President's findings regarding the
acquisition's threat to national security are not subject to judicial
review.30
While Exon-Florio is designed to protect national security, it
does not specifically define this term,31 making it difficult to
determine what types of acquisitions raise national security concerns.
The statute does, however, provide some factors that the President
may take into account in considering an acquisition's effect on
national security:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet
national defense requirements, including the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other
supplies and services,
25. Id. ("The President may direct the Attorney General to seek appropriate relief,
including divestment relief, in the district courts.").
26. Id. § 2170(e)(1).
27. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706). The
IEEPA permits the President to void, prevent, or prohibit a foreign acquisition of a
domestic entity during a national emergency arising from an unusual and extraordinary
threat to national security, foreign policy, or the U.S. economy. See id. The JEEPA is
unwieldy because it requires a national emergency declaration, the economic equivalent of
a declaration of hostilities against the acquiring company's government. See Robinson,
supra note 17, at 181.
28. § 2170(e)(2).
29. See id. § 2170. The CFIUS must begin its investigation within thirty days after
notification of the proposed acquisition, and must complete it within forty-five days of
commencement. Id. § 2170(a). The President must announce his decision based on the
CFIUS investigation recommendations within fifteen days of the investigation's
completion. Id. § 2170(d).
30. Id. § 2170(e).
31. Id. § 2170.
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(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity
by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the
United States to meet the requirements of national security,
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction
on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any
country [listed on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special
Country List or identified by the Secretary of State as a country
that supports terrorism, or as a country of concern regarding
missile or biological and chemical weapons proliferation], and
(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction
on United States international technological leadership in areas
affecting United States national security. 2
The Conference Report for the Exon-Florio Amendment also
gives some indication of what constitutes "national security." The
report states that the term should be "interpreted broadly without
limitation to particular industries. The President is authorized to take
action under this section with respect to a merger, acquisition, or
takeover involving a firm in any industry provided that the facts and
circumstances warrant the presidential findings required under this
provision."33 Although this statement indicates that the President can
determine that there is credible evidence of a threat to national
security even if the acquisition is of a company that is part of an
industry not traditionally associated with national security,34 the
proffered guidance does not provide much assistance in determining
what constitutes credible evidence.
House Resolution 344 proposed several arguments asserting that
the facts of the CNOOC-Unocal situation constituted credible
evidence of a threat to national security. Only one of these
arguments focused on what many would consider traditional national
32. Id. § 2170(f) (stating that the President may consider these factors among others).
33. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 926 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1959. At least one commentator argues that the intent was to
establish a pornography-type standard of "you'll know it when you see it." Robinson,
supra note 17, at 185. While this lax standard may suggest that Exon-Florio can be
blatantly overused to meet political ends, the President has used the provision only once
(out of 1,500 cases filed with the CFIUS) to block a transaction. See Mouawad, supra note
11.
34. See 134 CONG. REC. 8121 (1988) (statement of Rep. Fish) (stating his belief that
application of Exon-Florio "is not limited to those industries which develop and produce
tanks, rifles and fighter-bombers").
35. See H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H5570 (2005) (enacted).
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36 Resecurity concerns. The Resolution observed that the oil industry
uses some sensitive technologies for exploration, production, and
refining, including technologies that have "dual-use" commercial and
military applications.37  Further, the Resolution reasoned that
CNOOC's acquisition of Unocal could give China access to
technologies that are otherwise subject to export licensing
requirements or could otherwise be restricted for export to China. 8
The remaining observations focused on economic and oil supply
considerations. 39  The Resolution asserted that "oil and natural gas
resources are strategic assets critical to national security and the
Nation's economic prosperity" and that Unocal's petroleum resources
are simply too vital to lose to Chinese control." The Resolution
further stated that China's increasing demand for oil is a significant
factor driving increases in global oil prices.4' Finally, the Resolution
expressed concern over the possibility that CNOOC would redirect
oil produced by Unocal to China, rather than placing the oil into the
global market.42 The Resolution's focus on economic policy and oil
supply suggests that national security was not the primary concern in
the CNOOC-Unocal situation.43
36. Of the twenty-three observations made in the Resolution, only five addressed





41. Id. ("China's consumption of crude oil is expected to grow by an additional 7.5
percent in 2005, and world oil prices are projected to rise significantly as a result of
increasing demand from China for oil."). The House also observed that increasing
Chinese demand for crude oil accounted for more than one-third of the 2004 increase in
global demand. Id.
42. Id. Participants in committee hearings also stressed this concern. Several
individuals testifying before the House Armed Services Committee claimed that the
Unocal purchase bid was essentially part of a Chinese strategic plan for domination of
global energy. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. of the Center for Security Policy argued that the
Unocal bid fits into China's long-term strategy of achieving "dominance of strategic
energy resources, materials and minerals, [and] technologies." Full Committee Hearing on
the National Security Implications of the Possible Merger Between the China National
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and the Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the H.
Armed Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President
and C.E.O., Center for Security Policy), 2005 WL 1656413 (F.D.C.H.). A former Director
of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, testified that "China is pursuing a national
strategy of domination of the energy markets and strategic dominance of the western
Pacific." Lohr, supra note 13.
43. Statements during the House of Representatives floor debate on the Resolution
further support this theory. See generally 90 CONG. REc. H5570 (daily ed. June 30, 2005)
(stating the arguments for and against the Resolution). During these debates,
Representatives stressed rising global oil prices and limited supply, the fact that CNOOC
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Facts supporting these arguments justify blocking CNOOC's
purchase of Unocal only if the President could have found that they
constituted credible evidence that the acquisition would threaten to
impair national security." This determination requires an
examination of the only case in which the President used the
Amendment to prevent the foreign acquisition of a U.S. entity. In
1989, the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Company ("CATIC") purchased MAMCO, Inc.45 CATIC was an
import-export company for the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace
Industry.46 This ministry conducts research and development and
engages in the design and manufacture of military and commercial
aircraft, aircraft engines, and missile technology for the Chinese
government.47 MAMCO was a privately-owned U.S. firm that
manufactured metal aircraft components primarily for the production
of civilian aircraft.48
After an investigation, the CFIUS recommended disapproval of
CATIC's acquisition of MAMCO.49 Because the parties had already
completed the deal, President George H.W. Bush ordered CATIC to
divest all its holdings in MAMCO.5 ° President Bush told Congress
that he believed this action was justified based on classified
information about some of CATIC's past activities which raised
serious concerns about its intentions with regard to MAMCO. 51
Some reports indicated that this classified information involved
CATIC's 1984 purchase of two prototype General Electric engines,
is majority-owned by the Chinese government, and problems with United States-Chinese
trade relations in general. See id.
44. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
45. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Urged To Void Sale of Airplane-Parts Maker to Chinese,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A9.
46. President's Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology
Import and Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc., 1 PUB.
PAPERS 144 (Feb. 2, 1990) [hereinafter President's Message].
47. Id.
48. See id. Boeing used some of these parts to manufacture military aircraft with
commercial counterparts (dual-use aircraft that could be configured for either commercial
or military use). See Wm. Gregory Turner, Comment, Exon-Florio: The Little Statute that
Could Become a Big Headache for Foreign Investors, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 701, 724
(1991).
49. See W. Robert Shearer, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist
Legislation Susceptible to Abuse, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1729, 1757 (1993) (noting that the
rationale for the CFIUS decision is unclear due to the confidential nature of the Exon-
Florio review process).
50. President's Message, supra note 46.
51. Id. ("It is my determination that this information constitutes the 'credible
evidence' required by the statute.").
[Vol. 841380
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which the Chinese disassembled to acquire their technology. 2
Administration officials also indicated that President Bush took the
action because the Defense Department and intelligence agencies
suspected that CATIC purchased MAMCO merely to acquire
technology that is regularly restricted for export or might be put to
military use.53  Although some argued that the President's
justifications were too weak to support the decision,5 4 the CATIC-
MAMCO example provides some hints as to what kinds of activities
could be considered a national security threat.
Using the CATIC-MAMCO example as a model, it is difficult to
argue the propriety of an Exon-Florio block of CNOOC's bid for
Unocal. In analogizing these cases, there are clear distinctions
between the circumstances and the parties on both sides of these
deals, On the seller's side of the deal, the activities of MAMCO and
Unocal are quite dissimilar. MAMCO did have some military contact
due to its products being used by Boeing in certain military aircraft.
Unocal, on the other hand, is an oil company with no known military
association.56
On the bidder's side of the deal, there is a glaring distinction
between the business activities of CNOOC and CATIC. CATIC was
an import-export agent of the Chinese ministry responsible for
development and manufacture of military aircraft and missile
technology. 7 CNOOC is an oil company.58 The contrast therefore, is
52. See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation Concern
to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at 1. The engines reportedly contained high-
performance metallurgical technology. Id. CATIC apparently ignored U.S. export
controls requiring that the Chinese not take the engines apart to harvest their technology.
Id.
53. Id. Interestingly, reports at the time indicated that President Bush's National
Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, urged the President not to void the sale. Id.
54. See id. (describing criticism from international trade groups characterizing the
decision as a politically motivated use of Exon-Florio in response to growing foreign
investment in the United States). The White House stressed that foreign policy
considerations did not influence the decision to order the divestiture. See President's
Message, supra note 46 (stating that the United States welcomes foreign direct investment
and that the President's action was solely in response to the circumstances of the case).
55. See supra note 48 (stating that Boeing used some MAMCO components for the
manufacture of military aircraft with commercial counterparts).
56. See UNOCAL CORP., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 2-5, available at http://library.
corporate-ir.net/library/11/111/111875/items/143257/2004-AR.pdf (discussing Unocal's
activities in the energy field which do not include military associations).
57. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
58. See CNOOC, Ltd., CNOOC Limited Operations, http://www.cnoocltd.com/
Operations/channel/opertionsl298.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (discussing CNOOC's
oil exploration and production activities); Reuters, CNOOC Ltd: Company Description,
http://www.investor.reuters.com/business/BusCompanyOverview.aspx?ticker=CEO.N&ta
20061 1381
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between a company that manufactures specialized equipment and
weapons for military applications, and a company that-like many
others in the world-harvests and processes oil. The only apparent
parallel between these companies is that they are both controlled by
the Chinese government.59 President Bush's justification for ordering
the MAMCO divestiture further illustrates the CATIC-CNOOC
distinction. The evidence of CATIC's suspect activities with sensitive
materials in the past' raised credible national security concerns
because of CATIC's military function. It would be difficult to make
the same argument about CNOOC, which has no known military
function or association.61 Therefore, the CNOOC purchase of Unocal
did not pose a threat to national security under the Exon-Florio
Amendment. This conclusion finds further support from the five
criteria the Amendment suggests the President could consider in
making a decision on a proposed acquisition.62
The first criterion requires that "domestic production [is] needed
for projected national defense requirements."63 The requirement that
domestic production is "needed" rather than simply "used"' suggests
that Unocal must have been a significant supplier of oil used to meet
national defense requirements. Even assuming that the everyday
U.S. oil requirement constitutes a national defense requirement, the
facts in this situation make it difficult to argue that Unocal's oil
production was "needed." Economic experts reported at the time
that Unocal's loss would not affect domestic requirements because
Unocal's production and reserves are too small to be significant.65
One expert asserted that the United States should not be concerned
about who owns Unocal's oil reserves because those reserves amount
rget= %2fbusiness%2fbuscompany%2fbuscompfake %2fbuscompoverview&cotype=1 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006) (providing investor's overview of CNOOC).
59. See supra notes 9,46-47 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
61. See CNOOC, Ltd., supra note 58 (providing a detailed company overview that
fails to mention any association between CNOOC and the Chinese military); Reuters,
supra note 58 (same).
62. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (2000).
63. Id. § 2170(f)(1).
64. Id.
65. See Laura D'Andrea Tyson, What CNOOC Leaves Behind, Bus. WK., Aug. 15,
2005, at 101, 101 (citing energy experts as asserting that "there is no reason the U.S. should
care who owns a particular oil company if its reserves are too small to influence the world
[oil] price"); CNOOC Drops Its Bid for Unocal, Economist.com Global Agenda, Aug. 2,
2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story-id=S %27 %28X%24%28
QQ%2F%25%20P%20D%0A&tranMode=none (subscription required) [hereinafter
CNOOC Drops Bid] (arguing that fears that the sale would foster Chinese oil dominance
are unfounded because Unocal is not even in the top forty oil companies in the world).
1382 [Vol. 84
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to only 1.75 billion barrels, while known global oil reserves exceed
one trillion barrels. 66 Comparing Unocal's daily production with U.S.
daily oil consumption further illustrates this point. Unocal produces
an average of 159,000 barrels of oil a day worldwide.67 In contrast,
the Department of Energy estimates that the United States consumes
an average of 20.8 million barrels of oil per day.68 Unocal's daily oil
production therefore amounts to only 0.76% of U.S. daily
consumption.
Economic experts also argued that even if Unocal were a
significant oil producer, concerns over the loss of Unocal's domestic
oil production were ill-founded because oil is a global commodity.69
They asserted that because oil is a global commodity, owning
petroleum reserves in the ground does not provide any protection
from sudden spikes in oil and gas prices.70 Energy expert Jerry Taylor
testified before the House Armed Services Committee that even if
CNOOC's ownership of Unocal resulted in the diversion of Unocal's
total oil production to China, it would have no effect on oil supply.
Taylor stated that "Unocal production redirected towards China
would simply displace imports from other suppliers. Those displaced
imports would reenter the world market with no net effect on global
66. See Paul Blustein, Many Oil Experts Unconcerned over China Unocal Bid, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2005, at D1 (citing an energy specialist at the Institute for International
Economics).
67. UNOCAL CORP., supra note 56, at 2.
68. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration's United States
Overview, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Usa/Profile.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
Of the 20.8 million barrels of oil the United States consumes daily, 12.2 million barrels
(59%) are imported. Id.
69. See Lohr, supra note 13 (discussing criticism of congressional opposition to the
CNOOC bid); Tyson, supra note 65 (same).
70. See Blustein, supra note 66; Lohr, supra note 13. One expert used a comparison
between oil prices in Britain and Japan during the price increases set off by the Iranian
Revolution as an example. During this time, Britain was oil self-sufficient, while Japan
depended on imported oil. Even though Britain had its own oil fields, both countries paid
the same amount for the oil they used. JERRY TAYLOR, CATO INSTITUTE, WRITTEN
TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE MERGER OF THE CHINA NATIONAL
OFFSHORE OIL CORPORATION WITH UNOCAL CORPORATION (2005),
http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/Taylor7-13-05.pdf. This argument is bolstered
by the recent experience with oil prices. As oil prices have steadily risen since the
beginning of 2005, the United States has been able to do little to alleviate the price
increases. Oil and the Global Economy: Counting the Cost, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 2005, at
55. These increases have been consistent despite the fact that the United States has
significant domestic oil production and a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. See U.S.
Department of Energy, supra note 68 (stating the United States produces 7.5 million
barrels per day and has total oil stocks consisting of 1.69 billion barrels).
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supply."71  These arguments make it difficult to maintain that
CNOOC's acquisition of Unocal would have been a threat to national
security under the "needed for projected national defense
requirements"72 criterion.
The second statutory criterion the President may consider is the
"capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national
defense requirements. 7 3 The statute further specifies several factors
the President should consider in determining if the United States
could bear the loss of a domestic entity including "the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies
and services."74 In Unocal's case, this would not have been a factor
because oil is a common commodity.7 5 Many other U.S. companies
would continue oil production even if CNOOC acquired Unocal and
diverted all the oil Unocal produced to China. The Department of
Energy lists fifteen major U.S. oil companies as of 2005.76 At the time
of CNOOC's purchase bid, Unocal was only the eighth largest
domestic supplier,77 producing only 58,000 barrels of oil a day in the
United States.78 In contrast, total domestic oil production totals 7.5
million barrels a day.79 Unocal's domestic daily production amounts
to only 0.77% of the U.S. total. Losing Unocal would therefore not
significantly affect the capability or capacity of the domestic oil
industry to meet national defense requirements pursuant to the
second criterion.
The third criterion the President may consider when determining
whether to block an acquisition on national security grounds is the
"control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to
meet the requirements of national security."8 This should not have
71. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 4. Robert J. Priddle, former executive director of the
International Energy Agency, agrees that regardless of what China did with Unocal's oil,
"the cost of oil will be set between world supply and demand, and not by arrangements
like this." Blustein, supra note 66.
72. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 2170(f)(2).
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
76. See U.S. Department of Energy, supra note 68 (listing the top fifteen major U.S.
oil companies including Amerada Hess, Anadarko, Apache, BP, ChevronTexaco, CITGO,
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Occidental, Marathon, Shell, Sunoco, Unocal, Valero, and
Williams).
77. CNOOC Drops Bid, supra note 65.
78. TAYLOR, supra note 70.
79. See U.S. Department of Energy, supra note 68.
80. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(3) (2000).
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been a valid concern in the CNOOC-Unocal transaction. First, oil is
a global commodity8' and is in abundant supply.82 Second, foreign
control of the eighth largest U.S. oil company83 will not result in
control over domestic industries and commercial activity because
there are still fourteen other major suppliers.8' Unocal's loss
therefore would not affect United States capability and capacity to
meet national security requirements pursuant to this criterion.
The last two criteria the President may consider address
situations in which the foreign bidder may acquire military or
otherwise sensitive technology from the U.S. company it acquires.
The fourth criterion suggests that the President consider "the
potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of
military goods, equipment, or technology to any country ... that
supports terrorism; ... [is] a country of concern regarding missile
proliferation; or ... [is] a country of concern regarding the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons."85  The final
criterion suggests that the President consider "the potential effects of
the proposed or pending transaction on United States international
technological leadership in areas affecting United States national
security."86
In trying to make an argument pursuant to these final two
criteria, House Resolution 344 stated that the petroleum industry uses
some sensitive technologies for oil exploration, production, and
refining and that the United States requires licensing or restriction of
some of these items upon export to China. 7 It asserted that some of
these technologies have dual-use commercial and military
applications. 88  The Resolution also expressed the concern that
because other Chinese oil companies conduct operations in Sudan
and Iran-both of which are on the State Department's list of state
sponsors of terrorismg--CNOOC could potentially transfer sensitive
81. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
82. See supra text accompanying note 66 (stating that global reserves exceed one
trillion barrels).
83. See supra text accompanying note 77.
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. § 2170(f)(4).
86. Id. § 2170(f)(5).
87. See H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H5570 (2005) (enacted)
(including seismic analysis and processing, downhole logging sensors, and modeling
software as examples of sensitive technologies for petroleum exploration).
88. Id.
89. See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/
s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
138520061
1386 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
technology used by Unocal to these states.90 Had the CFIUS
determined after an investigation that Unocal possessed dual-use
technologies that CNOOC might have eventually transferred to the
Iranian or Sudanese governments, the proposed transaction would
have been problematic under the fourth criterion. 91 In addition, the
transfer of any other sensitive technology to China could have been
problematic under the fifth criterion because it might have
undermined U.S. technological leadership in an area affecting
national security.92 However, the fact that CNOOC offered to divest
certain assets from the deal to secure presidential approval for its bid
nullified these concerns in this instance. 93 If CNOOC was willing to
forego acquiring the problematic equipment, then there would be no
cause for concern under the fourth and fifth criteria.
An analysis of these statutory criteria for presidential blockage
pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment and the CATIC-MAMCO
situation undermines the argument that CNOOC's bid, to purchase
Unocal warranted prohibition based on the House Resolution 344
arguments. Consistent and accurate decisions under this Amendment
are vital due to the importance of foreign direct investment to the
U.S. economy.94 Commentators argue that the advantages of such
90. See H.R. Res. 344 (stating that "the national security of the United States is
threatened by the export of sensitive, export controlled, and dual-use technologies to
[Sudan and Iran]"). Note that the Resolution did not argue that national security would
be threatened merely by allowing the Chinese to possess these items. See id.
91. Such transfers would be sales of military goods to a country identified by the
Secretary of State as a country that supports terrorism in violation of § 2170(f)(4)(A)(i).
92. However, an argument can be made that such transfers would not be problematic
because many countries in the world are engaged in this business-many to a far greater
extent than the United States-and probably already have access to such equipment. See
CNOOC Drops Bid, supra note 65 (noting that at the time of the proposed transaction,
Unocal was not even in the top forty oil companies in the world); U.S. Department of
Energy, supra note 68 (noting that the United States imports most of the oil it consumes).
93. See Lohr, supra note 13. This offer is consistent with China's increasing demand
for oil and other resources to supply its industrialization. See supra notes 9, 41 and
accompanying text. Indeed, much of the Resolution itself focused on China's rapidly
increasing oil consumption and projected rise in demand. See H.R. Res. 344. If the
Chinese were primarily interested in obtaining Unocal's oil reserves, it seems unlikely that
they would chance the bid's success on acquiring some sensitive equipment owned by
Unocal.
94. The United States has historically welcomed such investment. See Joseph E.
Reece, Buyer Beware: The United States No Longer Wants Foreign Capital To Fund
Corporate Acquisitions, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 282-85 (1990) (discussing the
historic importance of foreign investment in the United States). Alexander Hamilton
stated that foreign investment "ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary,
conducing to put into motion a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion
of useful enterprise than could exist without it." Id. at 279 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG.
994 (1791)).
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investment include job creation, increased real estate values, land
preservation, and improved local economies, among others.95
Pursuant to this encouragement of foreign direct investment, U.S.
trade policy has traditionally encouraged such investment.96 Major
incentives for investment in the United States include the relatively
little restriction placed on foreign investment compared to other
countries97 and U.S. political stability with regard to trade policy.98
While the Exon-Florio Amendment can be vital to protecting
national security when used properly, arbitrary use can actually
detract from the advantages of foreign direct investment in the U.S.
economy. Arbitrary application of the Amendment slows down the
acquisition process, makes direct investment in the United States
economy somewhat risky, and creates the potential for divestiture of
completed deals.99 This could mire a prospective deal in uncertainty,
making it unprofitable or not worth the effort of the foreign
investor."° The lack of a consistent definition of national security
makes foreign direct investment in light of Exon-Florio even more
uncertain.'0' Furthermore, a foreign investor whose bid was
improperly blocked has no available recourse in the courts because
presidential actions under the Amendment are not subject to judicial
review." Creating such a potentially unfriendly environment for
foreign direct investment could ultimately decrease such investment
95. Shearer, supra note 49, at 1751 (discussing the "devastating potential of Exon-
Florio").
96. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(11)(A) (2000) (stating that the principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding foreign direct investment are to reduce or
eliminate barriers to such investment and to develop rules that will help ensure a free flow
of foreign investment).
97. Turner, supra note 48, at 708-09 n.42 (comparing government restrictions on
foreign investment in the United States with those of other major economies).
98. See Shearer, supra note 49, at 1749-51 (noting expert assertions that the incentives
for investing in the United States include a well-developed infrastructure, extensive
transportation networks, and political stability).
99. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (describing Exon-Florio's ninety-
day timeline for final presidential decisions, lack of definite application criteria, and the
fact that the President can order divestiture when the parties have already completed the
acquisition).
100. See Turner, supra note 48, at 739 (arguing that due to Exon-Florio's effects on the
foreign investor, strict use of the Amendment can contribute to a decline in the U.S.
economy).
101. See Shearer, supra note 49, at 1768. Shearer argues that the vague definition of
"national security" creates three major problems: (1) it gives the President substantial
discretion to control the flow of foreign investment in the United States; (2) it imposes
uncertainties for foreign investors structuring acquisitions involving U.S. companies; and
(3) it creates the possibility that many potentially threatening foreign acquisitions will
escape scrutiny by the CFIUS. Id. at 1765-69.
102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2000).
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as foreign buyers flock to countries where they feel they may have a
greater chance of success.
The Chinese reaction to the Unocal purchase bid failure
illustrates some of these concerns. CNOOC released the following
statement shortly after announcing its decision to pull its bid:
The unprecedented political opposition that followed the
announcement of our proposed transaction ... was regrettable
and unjustified .... This political environment has made it
very difficult for us to accurately assess our chance of success,
creating a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable
risk to our ability to secure this transaction. 03
The chief information officer of Falcon Power, a Beijing-based
energy consulting firm, echoed this sentiment by stating that "[t]he
way the U.S. government has treated CNOOC and politicized the
deal will largely frustrate Chinese companies. The companies not
only in oil but all other industries will not want to play the game by
the U.S. rules."'" Experts believe this situation could lessen Chinese
interest in future investment and make the Chinese less cooperative
with U.S. initiatives in the future. 05
In addition to illustrating the effects of arbitrary use of Exon-
Florio on foreign direct investment, the CNOOC-Unocal situation
also demonstrates the adverse effects of losing such investment on
U.S. shareholders and employees. In this instance, Unocal's
shareholders lost at least $1.5 billion in profit from the failure of the
CNOOC deal. 06 Some Unocal employees may lose their jobs. While
CNOOC pledged to retain the jobs of substantially all of Unocal's
employees (including U.S. employees),107 Chevron promised cost
savings of $325 million from the merger, which will include job
losses. 08
Although the threat of an Exon-Florio block in the CNOOC-
Unocal situation may not have been wise in light of these
repercussions, there were still legitimate concerns surrounding the
103. Press Release, supra note 14.
104. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 1 (quoting Han Xiaoping).
105. White, supra note 9.
106. See id. (noting that Unocal accepted Chevron's $17 billion cash and stock bid,
while CNOOC's final bid stood at $18.5 billion cash). CNOOC's officers considered
raising their bid closer to $20 billion, but were reportedly reluctant to do so because of
resistance in Washington. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 1.
107. Letter from Fu Chengyu, Chairman & CEO, CNOOC Ltd., to Members of
Congress (June 27, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
108. CNOOC Drops Bid, supra note 65.
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proposed Unocal purchase. CNOOC's proposed acquisition of
Unocal likely did not present a threat to national security, but the fact
that the Chinese government owned a majority share of CNOOC was
a valid cause for concern. This concern is more of an economic than a
national security issue: government majority ownership of foreign
investors may threaten the economic interests of the United States by
introducing a powerful, state-backed company into the competitive,
private free-market U.S. economy. 1°9
A similar situation arose in 1992 when Thomson-CSF, a French
defense and aerospace firm in which the French government had a
fifty-eight percent ownership stake, made a $450 million bid to
acquire the missile and aerospace divisions of LTV Corporation, a
financially struggling U.S. defense conglomerate.' The next closest
bid was $385 million from the Vought Corporation, a U.S.
company."' The bankruptcy court overseeing the LTV proceeding
accepted the Thomson bid,"2  but the proposal encountered
significant political opposition in the United States.'13 This opposition
was based on three concerns. 4 First, some worried that the transfer
of LTV's sensitive technology to France and then to more hostile
countries could compromise national security."' The second concern
was the vulnerability of American defense companies to foreign
109. See Matthew D. Riven, Recent Development, The Attempted Takeover of LTV by
Thomson: Should the United States Regulate Inward Investment by Foreign State-Owned
Enterprises?, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 759, 767-69 (1993) (discussing the impact of foreign
state-owned or subsidized companies competing in the U.S. free market economy).
110. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848,850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Contracts with
the U.S. military constituted ninety-eight percent of the missile division's revenues. Id. at
850.
111. Id. at 850-51 (noting that the Vought Corporation was a joint venture formed by
subsidiaries of the Martin Marietta Corporation and the Lockheed Corporation-both
U.S. companies).
112. Id. at 852. The court accepted the Thomson bid after Thomson offered to pay
LTV a $20 million reverse breakup fee if the bid failed due to an inability to acquire the
required U.S. government approvals. The break-up fee was the issue between the litigants
in this case. Id. at 849-50.
113. Id. at 852-54. On July 2, 1992, the Senate voted ninety-three to four in favor of a
nonbinding resolution declaring that the proposed sale would be "detrimental to the
national security interests of the United States." Steven Pearlstein, Opposition to LTV
Bid Intensifies; Congress, Bush Panel Fault Thomson Deal, WASH. POST, July 3, 1992, at
Fl. The House of Representatives started work on a military spending bill that would
have barred the Pentagon from granting contracts to the LTV aerospace and missile
divisions if they were acquired by a foreign interest. Id.
114. In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. at 852 n.5.
115. Id. LTV representatives testified before the bankruptcy court that as much as
seventy-five to eighty percent of the company's revenues came from contracts requiring
access to classified Communications Security Information. Id. at 851.
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takeovers.1 6  The final concern was "the potential inability of
American firms to compete with Thomson given its suspected
subsidization by the French government."1 7  This final issue is
analogous to the economic concerns in-the CNOOC-Unocal situation.
Just as concern existed over Vought's ability to compete not only
against Thomson, but also against French government subsidies,"8
there were concerns about Chevron's ability to compete against
CNOOC, backed by the Chinese government. The Economist noted
that "[f]irms that are directly or indirectly state-owned have access to
the vast resources of the Chinese state. Even those that are
nominally independent can obtain loans that are virtually interest-
free from state-owned banks."' 9  CNOOC would have drawn $7
billion from the Chinese government, and another $6 billion in low-
interest loans from state banks if its bid succeeded. 2 ° This helps
explain why CNOOC was able to top Chevron's initial bid by almost
$2 billion.'12
Although the financial advantage of investors backed by foreign
governments is a valid concern, this Recent Development's earlier
analysis illustrates that Exon-Florio is ill-suited to address this type of
economic issue. The Conference Report for the Exon-Florio
Amendment supports this argument.22 The original House bill
proposed an investigation "to determine the effects on national
security, essential commerce, and economic welfare of mergers,
acquisitions ... and takeovers by or with foreign companies which
involve U.S. companies engaged in interstate commerce.' 1 23  The
Senate amendment retreated somewhat from this language in calling
for investigation of the proposed acquisition's effect on "national
116. Id. at 852 n.5.
117. Id.
118. See Steven Pearlstein, Carlyle Group, French Firm Win LTV Bid; Judge Accepts
Offer for Aerospace Division, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1992, at C1 (quoting the Chairman of
Martin Marietta, Norman R. Augustine, questioning how his corporation could outbid a
firm that had the French government's financial resources behind it); Steven Pearlstein,
Undoing a Done Deal; How a Few Key Days Broke Marietta's Grip on LTV Aerospace,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1992, at H1 (quoting Chairman Augustine as stating that "[t]hey
were using the French Treasury to buy a position in the U.S. market").
119. CNOOC Drops Bid, supra note 65.
120. See id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 924-27 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1957-60 (including the proposed applicability of the Exon-Florio
Amendment in the House bill, changes made in the Senate amendment, and the final
Conference agreement).
123. Id. at 1957.
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security, or essential commerce which relates to national security.' 1 24
The Senate version qualified the consideration of essential commerce
and deleted the reference to economic welfare. The Conference
agreement and final version of the Amendment retreated from the
House language even further. The prime consideration in the final
version is whether the foreign entity may take any action that
"threaten[s] to impair the national security.' 115  These changes
indicate that Congress considered and ultimately rejected Exon-
Florio's applicability to strictly economic concerns. 26
Unfortunately, these economic concerns will not simply go away.
China's continuing rise in the international economy indicates that
problems similar to those in the CNOOC-Unocal bid will likely recur.
This Recent Development has argued that invoking the Exon-Florio
Amendment to neutralize these economic concerns is not consistent
with the original intent and design of the Amendment and may lead
to long-term economic repercussions. Some changes in the existing
review framework may be required to address these concerns.
The first concern illustrated by the CNOOC-Unocal purchase
bid that must be addressed is the problem of foreign direct
investment by state-owned firms. An alternative solution to using the
Exon-Florio Amendment in these cases would be to use a committee
similar to the CFIUS to conduct reviews of the economic implications
of allowing a foreign state-owned corporation to acquire a domestic
firm. In much the same way that Exon-Florio gives the President a
means for conducting national security reviews of foreign direct
investment,27 Congress can include the additional task of reviewing
such investment for anti-competitive practices and related issues.2 s
This statutory delegation could establish a limit on the degree to
which a foreign firm seeking to invest in the United States could be
controlled by its home government. If government control exceeds
this limit, the reviewing committee could recommend that the
President block the transaction if the committee finds that the
transaction threatens U.S. economic welfare. The
telecommunications field provides precedent for such a provision.
124. Id. at 1938.
125. Id. at 1573; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1) (2000).
126. Members of the Reagan administration played a significant part in convincing
Congress to remove any consideration of "essential commerce." See Robinson, supra note
17, at 183. Officials at the Departments of Commerce and Treasury and the U.S. Trade
Representative all lobbied against any consideration of essential commerce. Id.
127. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
128. See Riven, supra note 109, at 778 (arguing that the "CFIUS ought to apply a
standard that protects competition").
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996129 permits the Federal
Communications Commission to refuse to grant or to revoke a license
to a telecommunications company if any foreign entity (government-
owned or not) has more than a twenty-five percent controlling
interest in the company.1 30
The second concern illustrated by the CNOOC-Unocal purchase
bid is the problem of arbitrary use of Exon-Florio where such use
would be economically expedient. Exon-Florio's vague guidelines for
determining what constitutes a threat to national security131 make it a
readily-available weapon in circumstances like the present case,
where the primary fears revolved around oil supply and economic
considerations rather than traditional national security concerns.
Such use of Exon-Florio creates significant uncertainty by giving
potential foreign investors very little indication of whether their
proposed investments will be considered a national security threat.132
To address this problem, Exon-Florio's applicability should be more
precisely defined, thereby giving investors a better idea of their
investment's chances for success.
A sensible first step would be to define more specifically the
term national security to include clearer guidance on where national
security is and is not implicated. This guidance would have to be
specific enough to give potential foreign investors a reasonable basis
to judge their proposal's chances for success, while still preserving
adequate discretion for the President to make a decision based on all
available circumstances. One proposal would provide that the foreign
ownership or control of a U.S. company that supplies an essential
product poses a threat to national security only where the U.S.
company is one of very few suppliers of the product, the amount of
time to develop the product in the United States is unreasonably long,
and there is no adequate means to stockpile the product.'33 Such a
criterion would give a company like CNOOC a reasonable basis for
determining its chances of success in an Exon-Florio review, while
still providing significant discretion to the President.
Congress is already taking steps to address the issues arising from
the CNOOC-Unocal situation. On September 29, 2005, Senator
129. Pub, L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
130. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (2000) (stating that the FCC may revoke or refuse to
grant a license if it finds that "the public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation
of such license").
131. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
132. See Shearer, supra note 49, at 1768.
133. See Turner, supra note 48, at 736-37.
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James Inhofe introduced a bill that would add a sixth Exon-Florio
criterion that the President could consider in determining whether or
not to block an acquisition on national security grounds. The
proposed Foreign Investment Security Act of 2005134 suggests that the
President consider "the long-term projections of United States
requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and
materials and for economic security"'35 in addition to the existing five
criteria. While this addition would help companies like CNOOC
realize they may encounter problems in their bids to purchase U.S.
companies, it does not provide the level of specificity suggested by
this Recent Development.
The inevitability that a situation similar to that presented by the
CNOOC-Unocal bid will arise again at some point in the near future
requires that the United States have a coherent plan to implement.
Such a plan must protect domestic national security while
encouraging foreign faith in the open and consistent investment
policies of the United States. This is the best way to walk the line
between encouraging foreign direct investment and vigilantly
guarding against future threats to national security.
MICHAEL PETRUSIC
134. S. 1797, 109th Cong. (2005).
135. Id. § 2(3)(D).
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